International Lawyer
Volume 11

Number 4

Article 4

1977

The Defense of Coercive Foreign Legislation in Competition
Proceedings before the Commission of the European Economic
Community
Leslie J. Preston

Recommended Citation
Leslie J. Preston, The Defense of Coercive Foreign Legislation in Competition Proceedings before the
Commission of the European Economic Community, 11 INT'L L. 619 (1977)
https://scholar.smu.edu/til/vol11/iss4/4

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at SMU Scholar. It has been accepted
for inclusion in International Lawyer by an authorized administrator of SMU Scholar. For more information, please
visit http://digitalrepository.smu.edu.

LESLIE J. PRESTON*

The Defense of Coercive Foreign
Legislation in Competition
Proceedings Before the Commission

of the European Economic Community
Introduction
Contrary to prognostication,' the EEC has taken a stand in respect to a
defense to a charge of antitrust violation based upon coercive foreign legislation, at least insofar as it involves Article 85 proceedings before the Commission of the EEC. The EEC first announced its position in the Third Report on
Competition Policy (Annexed to the "Seventh General Report on the Activities of the Communities") by stating that "Article 85 would not apply to
export agreements imposed on firms in non-member countries by their governments, unless there was agreement or concerted practice between the firms." 2
A subsequent decision of the Commission rendered on November 29, 1974,
contained the following dicta: "four types of measures can be distinguished
and should be differently assessed: . . . (b) measures imposed on Japanese
undertakings by the Japanese authorities. These measures are also outside the
scope of Article 85. However ....
Article 85 could be applicable to any
agreements or concerted practices additional to such measures."'
In both instances, there was a failure to indicate what legal rationale, if any,
might have served as the basis for the apparent acceptance of the concept of

*J.D., University of West Los Angeles; LL.M., Vrije Universiteet Brussel.
."There is no precedent in the EEC Antitrust law or adjudications concerning the possibility of
invoking the existence of coercive foreign legislation as a defense against attack by the EEC antitrust officials. While theoretically such defense would probably not be valid at the present time,
it seems unlikely that a rather pragmatical organization such as the EEC would try to deal with
coercive foreign legislation . . . through political negotiations, or political counter measures. ...
The EEC would probably either try to negotiate a repeal of such law or raise the external tariff for
such product or organize import cartels." 28 Bus. LAW. 241, 268.
2

Third Report on Competition Policy (Annexed to the "Seventh General Report on the Activities of the Communities"), at p. 27.
'Commission Decision of 29 November 1974, 0.J. No. L 343, p. 11 (only the French text is
authentic).
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coercive foreign legislation as a defense to alleged violations of the EEC rules
of competition, 4 especially Article 85(1) of the Treaty of Rome.,
The Problem in Context
As the doctrine of coercive foreign legislation as a defense in competition
proceedings has yet to be actually applied in proceedings before the Commission of the EEC, 6 a view of the concept in hypothetical context might aid in
perceiving what problems might be solved by its application, as well as those
that it may possibly create. For purposes of illustration, our hypothetical will
involve the export of raw materials from non-member States to the Community.
tensions affecting the markets
The Commission is concerned about "...
for raw materials. . . . The general approach of the Commission in the competition policy field and its individual measures and decisions should be seen in
this context.'
For example, "the Commission's task is to examine the extent and quality
of competition between the various types of firms serving (inter alia) the oil
market within the Community and in particular to see whether the comportment of any of the companies involved, especially during the period of crisis,
amounted to an infringement of the rules of competition of the Treaty." 8 One
cannot dismiss the possibility of a Commission investigation resulting in the
discovery that one or more governments of the oil producing states have
placed restrictions on firms engaged in the production and/or distribution processes of oil and oil products to EEC Member States, or to firms within the
EEC.

'See note 16, infra.
'The decision referred to in note 3 was concerned with the application of Article 85, as was the
Third Report referred to in note 7, and only Article 85 is discussed. No implication as to the
relevance of coercive foreign legislation as a defense to Article 86 proceedings is intended.
'In the decision of the Commission, referred to in note 3, the Commission found that "[t]he
facts ... do not constitute measures ... imposed on Japanese undertakings by the Japanese
authorities nor, even to the Commission's knowledge, authorized by those authorities ....,p.
12. To the author's knowledge, no decision of the Commission exists, nor a case of the Court of
Justice, in which it was found that "measures imposed" by an agreement, or concerted practice,
having anti-competitive results in the EEC.
'Fourth Report on Competition Policy (Annexed to the "Eighth General Report on the Activities of the Communities"), "Introduction," p. 1."The shortage in supplies of crude oil and
the resulting reduction in the availability of oil products, which had reached an acute stage at the
end of 1973, continued into the early months of 1974. Uncertainty and instability continued to
dominate the supply of crude oil as groupings of both producers and consumer nations pursued
their varying proposals aimed at achieving, respectively, pricing and policies which would accommodate the continued demands of producer nations while restoring equilibrium to the energy sectors of the economies of consumer nations." Ibid., Part 1, ch. I, Sec. 2, p. 1. The foregoing
statements by the Commission are capable of being interpreted as indicative not only of the EEC's
concern as to its relationships with oil producing States, but as to its relationships with States that
produce other raw materials which are exported into the EEC.
'Ibid., Part 1, ch. I, Sec. 2, p. 3.
International Lawyer, Vol. 11, No. 4
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Our hypothetical contention is that a non-member State which produces and
exports a vital raw material, such as oil, might be willing to use that raw
material as a political weapon. To test that contention, one has merely to look
at the recent history of the relationships between Western Europe and the
United States on the one hand, with the oil producing States of the Middle
East on the other. In particular, one might consider the attitudes and opinions
of the Arab League in regard to the EEC-Israel Commercial Agreement.,
A boycott involving denial of a vital raw material, whether by refusal to sell
or by raising prices to the point that the product cannot be purchased by the
consumer, can be expected to produce a severe and certain response from the
EEC which imports most of its raw materials. Certainly the withholding of oil
and petroleum products by a lengthy boycott can virtually strangle the Community. Whether such a boycott will ever take place is not purely speculative.
However, there are other ramifications of such a boycott to be considered.
Assume that an EEC-based undertaking, doing business in a foreign State
and engaged in the distribution into the EEC of a vital raw material which it
exports from the foreign State, is instructed by the government of that foreign
State to boycott the EEC. What legal recourse does a private party or a
member State have, as potentially injured parties, at the level of the Commission in proceedings against the alleged violator of the rules of competition?
If the Commission allows the defense of coercive foreign legislation to be
successfully propounded by an EEC-based defendant, there may be no effective legal redress available to the plaintiff. On the other hand, if the Commission renders a decision unfavorable to the defendant, such decision could have
the effect of forcing the defendant to quit doing business within the foreign
State.
In a United States case, Interamerican Refining Corporation v. Texaco
Maracaibo,, Inc., 307 F. Supp. 1302 (1970), the court rejected the plaintiff's
contentions that the defendant's refusal to sell Venezuelan crude oil to the
plaintiff allowed the jury to make ". . . inferences from that fact . . ."," that
its bonded status and consequent market advantages so threatened the defendant's customers and refineries owned by the defendant's parents and affiliates, that the defendant resolved to drive the plaintiff out of business.'' The

'A newspaper report of a recent meeting of the Arab League, except for Libya, which declared
its intent to boycott EEC-Arab Conferences as a protest against the EEC-Israel agreement, indicated unfavorable Arab reaction to the agreement and pointed to "It]he European hope to ensure long term supplies of Arab oil and to avoid being victims of any future Arab oil boycott, such
as was imposed at the time of the 1973 Middle East war." International Herald Tribune, p. 2, May
21, 1975.
0°307 F. Supp. 1302, at p. 1302.
''The antitrust statutes and court decisions involving antitrust litigation have been influential in

the formation of the EEC rules of Competition, their development, and the application and interInternationalLawyer, Vol. 11, No. 4
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United States District Court of Delaware rejected plaintiff's argument because
"It ignores defendant's right to show that participation in what might otherwise be an illegal boycott is immunized by acquiescence in the order of a
foreign government."'
Although both the plaintiff and defendant were incorporated in the United
States,' 3 the Venezuelan "order" was politically motivated because two of
plaintiff's shareholders were political opponents of the regime in power in
Venezuela at the time of the alleged boycott." The plaintiff in Interamerican
ceased its operations ostensibly as a result of the boycott ordered by the
Venezuelan government and carried out by the defendant. " It is evident that
serious economic difficulties can befall a private plaintiff if the defendant successfully pleads the defense of coercive foreign legislation.
In the case a government, such as a Member State of the EEC, is caught in
this "squeeze play," the problems which arise are political, as well as
economic. The normal functioning of its economy might be disrupted so
severely that the political opponents of a regime in power could conceivably
make use of the regime's apparent inability to maintain a supply of necessary
raw materials by alleging a failure in its conduct of foreign relations.
At least one important theoretical consequence of permitting the application
of coercive foreign legislation as a defense in competition proceedings, is that a
foreign government could limit the effectiveness of an affected state's legislation and commercial policy by legislating for, or against, a particular firm, and
that firm need not necessarily be headquartered in the foreign state. On the
contrary the firm might even be based in the affected state.

The Law and Policy of the EEC
Article 85, Treaty of Rome
Article 85(1) of the Treaty of Rome establishing the EEC, prohibits as
.. incompatible with the Common Market: all agreements between undertakings, decisions by associations of undertakings and concerted practices
which may affect trade between Member States and which have as their object
or effect the prevention, restriction, or distortion of competition within the

pretation of those Rules. For an excellent example, see ICI v. EC Commission, (48/69) (1972)
C.M.L.R. 557, 2 CCH COM. MKT. REP. 78161 (July 14, 1972).

12307 F. Supp. 1302, at p. 1302.
"Ibid., at p. 1292, note 2.
"Ibid., at p. 1294.
1Id.
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Common Market .
"..
,6 The article then goes on to list particular practices
which are prohibited, although the list is not inclusive.' 7 Article 85(2) states
that "any agreements or decisions prohibited pursuant to this article shall be
null and void."' 8
Article 85(3), if it applies, can "save" an agreement or decision by associations from termination by declaring inapplicable the provisions of Article
85(1) to the arrangement provided it ". . . contributes to improving the production or distribution of goods or to promoting technical or economic progress, while allowing consumers a fair share of the resulting benefit, and...does not: (a) impose on the undertakings concerned restrictions which are not
indispensable to the attainment of these objectives; (b) afford such undertakings the posibility of eliminating competition in respect of a substantial part of
the products in question."' 9 "The Commission . . . has exclusive power to
declare inapplicable the rules prohibiting restrictive agreements when it considers that the conditions for this inapplicability are met. .. ."I' The Treaty of
Rome and the implementing Council Regulations are devoid of any provision
which allows the Commission to exempt any arrangement which violates Article 85(1), unless it meets the criteria for exemption laid down by Article
85(3).2"
A basic question of treaty interpretation necessarily arises as to the legal
ability of the Commission to declare any arrangement violative of Article 85(1)
exempt from its sanctions when such arrangement does not meet the criteria
for exemption set out in Article 85(3). It is also difficult to imagine the
benefits, if any, to the EEC by the exemption from its laws of "measures imposed" on an undertaking by a foreign government, if the resultant conduct is
a boycott of a Member State or a customer located in a Member State.
While the Commission has the discretionary authority to issue notices
*...which inform the economic circles concerned of the types of agreement
which, according to the Commission, do not come within the scope of application of Article 85, . . . (they) have no statutory force and serve merely as
statements of intent in dealing with certain matters, and, as such, do not bind

6Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Part 11, Title 1, ch. 1, Sec. 1, as
translated, published, and reprinted in 298 U.N.T.S. 3 (1958) by the Secretariat of the Interim
Committee for the Common Market and Eu 'atom, Brussels. Revision of translation found in
Documentsfor Law and Institutions in the Atlantic Area, Stein and Hay, p.93. Hereinafter referred to as "Documents."
"Ibid., at p. 93.
"Id.
"Id.
2°Goldman, at p. 18, citing EEC Article 85(3) and Council Regulation No. 17/62, as amended
by Council Regulation No. 59/62.
"Documents, supra, at 93.
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the Court of Justice." 2 2 Thus, even if the Commission had determined to exempt from Article 85 sanctions anticompetitive arrangements caused by coercive foreign legislation, its authority so to do appears questionable unless it ignores or derogates from the Treaty of Rome, or unless the Court of Justice can
supply a rationale to support the Commission's position. As of yet the Court
of Justice has not had an occasion to rule on the Commission's position.
Sovereign Immunity and Lack of Free Will
That the Commission can obtain jurisdiction over foreign-based undertakings doing business within the EEC is not questioned here. 3 Several writers
support the extra-territorial jurisdiction of sovereign states over foreign-based
enterprise,24 "[tihe policies and jurisprudence of a foreign country . . . not
(being) our concern." 2I This statement summarizes, rather succinctly, the legal
philosophy upon which the defense of coercive foreign legislation to United
States antitrust proceedings is based.
It has been suggested that ". . . the policy of sovereign immunity may supply analogous precedent for the defense of foreign compulsion." 26 Two lines
of reasoning derived from the United States case law support or at least follow
the suggestion.
First, that "[it is the foreign government which is the primary source of the
trouble and if it cannot be complained of because of sovereign immunity and
comity, the firm which is the foreign government's instrument also cannot be
complained of. .. "27 This argument also raises the problem of the firm's
lack of free will. Thus, this line of reasoning implies that one of the results of
coercive foreign legislation is that, for jurisdictional purposes, the foreign
sovereign and the enterprise are one and the same. Second, "If the restraint is,
by hypothesis, a sine qua non of doing business at all no commerce has been
restricted because it could not exist but for acquiescence in the restraint." 28
Subsidiary's Loss of Identity: Economic or Legal
Domination by the Parent
There are decisions by the Commission, as well as case law emanating from
the Court of Justice, which might provide analogous precedents in favor of the

"First Report on Competition Policy (Annexed to the "Fifth General Report on the Activities
of the Communities"), at p. 104; Parry and Hardy, at p. 293, 294.
"See Bellamy and Child, at pp. 53-56, and notes 18-31, at those pages.
2"Brewster, at p. 92; Brownlie, at pp. 291-94.
"Brewster, at p. 92.
"Ibid., at p. 94.
"Ibid., at p. 97.
"Ibid., at p. 94.
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argument that the concept of the defense of coercive foreign legislation does
indeed have a basis for its existence in EEC competition proceedings. Broadly
speaking, agreements between parent and subsidiary, or between affiliated
subsidiaries subject to common control, fall outside Article 85(1). "[T]he test
to be applied (to such agreements) is, whether the subsidiary, although having
a distinct personality, does not determine its behavior on the market in an
autonomous manner, but essentially carries out the instructions given to it by
the parent company.29 If the subsidiary does not enjoy any real autonomy in
the determination of its course of action, then Article 85(1) does not apply to
agreements between it and its parent, who together form one economic unit.
The criteria to be applied are essentially economic rather than legal." 3 0
Despite categorizing the "test" of the subsidiary's free will as an
"economic" rather than a legal consideration, it would seem to be equally applicable, as a test, to a foreign-based enterprise acting under the compulsion of
a foreign sovereign; the necessary inference being that a firm coerced by a
foreign government has not really made an agreement for lack of free will-a
general principle of contract law applied to both competition law and foreign
relations.
The Court of Justice, in ICI v. EC Commission, said, "When the subsidiary
does not enjoy any real autonomy in the determination of its course of action
on the market, the prohibitions imposed by Article 85(1) may be considered inapplicable in the relations between the subsidiary and the parent company with
which it then forms one economic unit." 3 ' In effect then, at least in EEC competition proceedings, the parent though legally separate from the subsidiary is
acting within the EEC and is, therefore, subject to the jurisdiction of the Community organs."
When is the subsidiary so dominated by the parent that the former can be
said to have lost its identity, insofar as the application of Article 85(1) is concerned? The answer of the Court of Justice, in ICI, supra, was-whether the
parent "held all, or in any event, the majority of the capital of its subsidiaries ... could decisively influence the pricing policy of its subsidiaries in
the Common Market and it did in fact make use of this power to give instructions. . ."
The Court was also persuaded by the fact that the parent had "sent its subsidiaries in the Common Market ... binding instructions as to the prices and

29

Bellamy and Child, at p. 60; see note 47, at that page.

"Ibid., at p. 60.
"'ICIv. EC Commission, supra, at note 14,

"Ibid., at 1 8007 and 8031.
"Ibid., at

8031.
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other conditions of sale which they were to apply to their customers." '' 3
Though the Court found evidence of only one instance of such event
there was no contrary evidence that the same conduct did not occur with
respect to subsequent violations, one year and again three years after the first
violation allegedly took place."
In Beguelin Import Co. v. G.L. Import-Export, S.A., the Court of Justice
took an approach similar to that offered by the Commission in its decision, Re
Christiani and Nielsen. 6 In Beguelin, the Court said that "Article 85(1) prohibits agreements when they have the object or effect of hindering competition. In the case of a contract conceding exclusive rights of sale that condition
is not met when such concession is in fact partially transferred by a parent
company to a subsidiary which although enjoying a distinct legal personality,
does not have any economic autonomy."'" It appears that the emphasis on the
economic factor is greater in Beguelin and Christianithan in the ICI case.
In all of these cases, the subsidiary's lack of autonomy was stressed and ICI,
Beguelin, and Christianishould not be read as containing and presenting contrary criteria for determining the status of the parent-subsidiary relationship.
These criteria should be reviewed as complementary means oy which the Court
of Justice can determine whether the parent-subsidiary relationship is one
economic entity, utilizing the criteria en masse, or separately, and regardless of
whether the components of the relationship are, in fact, legally separate.
It does not seem too difficult to transpose the criteria that the Court used in
assessing the parent-subsidiary relationship to a factual situation involving an
enterprise and a foreign state, the former being substituted for the subsidiary
and the latter for the parent.
The same threads of reasoning can be used to support the principle that an
undertaking coerced by a foreign government does not act of its own free will,
and conduct that would otherwise be a violation of Article 85(1) falls without
the prohibitions of that article and paragraph. By so doing, the question of being "null and void" under Article 85(2) does not arise, and there is no use
whatever for the escape provisions of Article 85(3) and the implementing
Council Regulations, 17/62.38

3

Id.

"Id.

"Re Christiani and Nielsen, (Commission Decision of June 18, 1969) J.O. 1969 L. 165/12
[1969] C.M.L.R. D 36; C.M.R. 9308.
11(22/71) 17 RECUEIL 949; (1972) C.M.L.R. 31, 95; C.M.R. 8149; 9 C.M.L.R.
Rev. 491.
"Documents, supra, at pp. 146-153.

International Lawyer, Vol. 11, No. 4

Defense of Foreign Legislation in Competition Proceedings

627

Third Report on Competition Policy ("Annexed to the
Seventh General Report on the Activities of the
Commission") vs. the "Franco-Japanese
Ballbearing Agreement" Decision
The Third Report on Competition Policy ("Annexed to the Seventh General
Report on the Activities of the Communities") and the decision of the Commission relating to the "Franco-Japanese ballbearings agreement," found that
an agreement to limit Japanese imports of ballbearings into France existed in
the form of a voluntary restraint. The principle as announced in the Third
Report was simply that agreements resulting from "measures imposed" by
any foreign government are not within the scope of Article 85()." In announcing its decision, the Commission made specific reference to the "Japanese
authorities." ' 0 While the Commission may have determined to be specific in
order to avoid enunciating any far-reaching principles, its decision was the
first in the EEC which appears to recognize the possibility of a defense to an
Article 85(1) violation on the basis of coercive foreign legislation. Although
found to be inapplicable because the "Japanese authorities" were not involved, it was an opportune time to clarify the principle as it applies to proceedings at the Commission level.'
The Third Report on Competition Policy and the Commission decision have
other subtle differences. The Third Report excludes for the scope of Article
85(1) only agreements or the undertakings of foreign governments as a consequence of measures imposed by those foreign governments.4 2 The Commission
decision relating to the Franco-Japanese ballbearing agreements limits application of the principle to "Japanese undertakings." This distinction may be
more than academic if an inference can be drawn therefrom that the defense of
foreign governmental coercion would not be available to an EEC-based firm
doing business in the EEC as well as in a foreign State, while a firm based in
the foreign State but doing business in the EEC could take advantage of the
defense enunciated by the Commission in regard to "measures imposed" by
such foreign State. This particular result arises only if the Commission's
language is interpreted literally. The Commission, therefore, should clarify its
position.
What constitutes a "measure imposed"? The Third Report on Competition
Policy takes the position that a measure which merely "authorizes" an agreement, rather than imposing one, will not necessarily save the undertaking from

"Third Report, supra, at p. 27.
"Commission Decision.of November 29, 1974, supra, at p. 11.
"Ibid., at p. 12.
"Third Report, at p. 27.
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the application of Article 85(1), the rationale being that if a measure is merely
authorized, the firm had an opportunity to choose whether or not to enter into
agreement or to enage in often prohibited practice. 3
Echoing the Report, the decision of the Commission states that "measures
resulting from agreements or concerned practices between undertakings which
are merely authorized by the Japanese under Japanese law ... would not
necessarily mean that Article 85 could not apply, since it would in no way alter
the fact that the undertakings concerned were free to refrain from entering into an agreement or engaging in concerted practices ... .""
This appears to be an attempt to distinguish the compulsory effect of coercive legislation from the apparent permissive nature of legislation which merely allows a firm to pursue certain conduct. The EEC has not yet provided
authority for identifying governmental directives that will take the form of and
be considered a "strong request" or "recommendation" from a foreign
government to an undertaking. United States courts have often wrestled with
this problem, and while their views are not entirely harmonious," they may,
perhaps, provide some guidance.
The U.S. Experience
Jurisdiction
In the early landmark case, American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co.,4 6
Justice Holmes indicated that if a foreign State acts as a result of inducement
by a private party within that State's jurisdiction, a court of the United States
cannot declare that, in regard to that act, the conduct is unlawful here as the
foreign State, by its actions, manifests the desirability and propriety of the
Act. 7 The plaintiff, American Banana Co., had alleged that the defendant
had procured the military assistance of a foreign State to drive the plaintiff out
of business and had contended that this conduct amounted to a conspiracy
violative of the Sherman Act."
One of the cases relied upon by the defendant and used by the Court to support its position was Underhill v. Hernandez," in which the Court stated:
". .. the courts of one country will not sit in judgment on the acts of the
government of another, done within its own territory."" 0 This was, apparent-

"Third Report, at p. 27; see note 3 at that page.
"Commission Decision of November 28, 1974, supra, at p. 12.
"See Bus. LAW. 241, at p. 257.
"160 F. 194 (C.C.S.N.Y.), aff'd, 166 F. 261 (2nd Cir. 1908), aff'd, 213 U.S. 347, 29 S. Ct. 511,
L. Ed. 826 (1909).
11213 U.S. 358.
'"15 U.S.C.A. §§ Iand 2.
U.S. 250, 18 S. Ct. 83, 42 L. Ed. 456 (1897).
"1168 U.S. 250, at p.252, 185 S.Ct. 83, at p. 89.
49168
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ly, the first judicial pronouncement of which was to become and is the "act of
state doctrine." Later cases, as will be seen, have made inroads on the authority of American Banana Co.
In Sabre Shipping Corporation v. American President Lines, Ltd.,5 the
defendants challenged the court's jurisdiction over their price-fixing arrangements. In finding that the Japanese government had not directed the conduct of the defendants, the court said that even if the facts were found to be
otherwise, such a finding ". . . would not necessarily immunize them from
prosecution or civil responsibility for acts done in United States Commerce. ''52
The Court's opinion, however, does not indicate under'what conditions such
"direction" by a foreign government would "immunize" the defendant's per
se illegal activities, if in fact they could be immunized at all. The Sabre dictum
has been interpreted to mean that courts do not lack the authority to determine
the conditions under which compulsion by a foreign State will immunize the
defendant's conduct."
The Supreme Court, in Continental Ore Company v. Union Carbide and
54
Carbon Corporation,
stated that inroads have indeed been made on the
authority of American Banana, supra." Relying primarily on United States v.
Sisal Sales Corp., 6 the Court distinguished between conduct which occurs
partly outside the United States and that which occurs wholly outside the
United States. In determining whether foreign governmental compulsion will
excuse an antitrust violation, U.S. courts are apparently willing to give more
weight to the domestic aspects of a defendant's conduct, rather than to the
foreign factors where the conduct complained of is partly within the United
States.
Beneficial Legislation: The Noerr-PenningtonDoctrine
Is a defendant before the Commission in a position to plead coercive foreign
legislation as a successful defense if such legislation is directly, or indirectly,
beneficial to the defendant, and if such legislation has come about because the
defendant petitioned the foreign government? Though this question has been
answered rather definitely in the context of an enterprise's domestic activities
as they relate to the legal organs of the United States Government or with
those of one or more of the several States, an answer to the question in a
foreign context has not yet appeared in U.S. case law.

"285 F. Supp. 949 (1968).
"Ibid., at p. 951.
"1307 F. Supp. 1291, at p. 2197.
"1370 U.S. 680.
"Ibid., at pp. 704, 705.
"6274 U.S. 286.
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The landmark case involving antitrust proceedings arising out of domestic
activities involving domestic institutions is Eastern Railroad President's Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc. et al. 11 The plaintiff's charges of a conspiracy to restrain trade and to monopolize the long distance freight industry
by conducting an extensive and misleading publicity campaign were successfully countered by the defendant. The alleged purpose of the defendants' conduct
was to gain legislation favorable to the defendants, as well as to discredit the
plaintiffs. Among the defenses used by the defendants was the right to petition
the government which was protected by the First Amendment.
In affirming the positions of the lower courts, the Supreme Court read the
Sherman Act as not forbidding attempts to obtain favorable legislation. The
Court found that the plaintiff's alleged injuries were merely incidental to the
act of petitioning for favorable legislation." The Court stated that ". . . it has
been held that where a restraint ... or monopolization is the result of valid
governmental action, as opposed to private action, no violation of the Act can
be made out." 9 This line of reasoning is more in accord with that of the Commission in that instead of excusing a violation of antitrust law, no violation
results as a consequence of governmental action.
under our
As a basis for its conclusion, the Court pointed out that "...
should
pass, or if
that
kind
a
law
of
whether
form of government the question
passed be enforced, is the responsibility of the appropriate legislative or executive branch of government so long as the law itself does not violate some
provision of the Constitution." 0 The Court found that no prohibition exists
in the Sherman Act which prevents "lobbying" a governmental organ," and
that otherwise to interpret the Sherman Act would be contrary to the Bill of
Rights and to what Congress intended in passing the Sherman Act.6
United Mine Workers of America v. Pennington63 confirmed the line of
reasoning the Court used in Noerr, supra. Pennington concerned the
lawfulness of a union-employer wage bargain under labor and antitrust laws,
which had the effect of driving marginal producers out of the industry because
they could not afford to pay the wages decided upon in the union contract. As
to the question whether a labor union might find itself within the scope of anti-

"365 U.S. 127, 81 S. Ct. 523, 52 L. Ed. 2d 262, reh'g denied, 365 U.S. 875, 81 S. Ct. 899, 5 L.
Ed. 2d 864.
"365 U.S. 127, at p. 129.
"Ibid., at p. 136.
6365 U.S. 127, at p. 136.
'1365 U.S. 127, at p. 137.
6Ibid., at p. 143.
6381 U.S. 657, 85 S. Ct. 1585.
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trust legislation'6 the Court concluded that there were circumstances which
might bring union activities within the ambit of the antitrust laws. 65
The Pennington Court was cognizant of a union's right to pursue the
. . uniformity of labor standards

. .

." regardless of the effect upon com-

petition." However, the Court qualified a union's right to enter into
agreements, whether or not they pertain to collective bargaining.6 7 Justice
White said: "One group of employers may not conspire to eliminate competitors from the industry and the union is liable with the employers if it
becomes a party to the conspiracy." ' 68 Thus, as to the central question put
forth, a union is not necessarily exempted from the application of antitrust
prohibitions when it attempts to secure uniform working conditions on an
industry-wide basis.6 '
In Pennington, the union-employer combination had approached the
Secretary of Labor in an effort to obtain amended legislation regarding
minimum wages in the industry.' 0 The union contended that the trial court had
erred in instructing the jury that while approaching, inter alia, the Seiretary of
Labor was not in and of itself conduct violative of the antitrust laws, when
anti-competitive purposes were attributed thereto, an illegal conspiracy could
be found."
The Supreme Court found that the instructions were not "mere harmless error" under the circumstances of the case. In reversing and remanding, 2 the
Court, per Justice White, said, "Joint efforts to influence public officials do
not violate the antitrust laws even though intended to eliminate competition.
Such conduct is not illegal either standing alone or as part of a broader scheme
73
itself violative of the Sherman Act.'
If the Commission ever chooses to recognize something akin to the NoerrPennington doctrine and to give it effect in the context of an enterprise-foreign
State relationship, not only would an agreement producing anti-competitive
effects within the EEC escape the prohibitions of Article 85(1), assuming the
defendant could plead coercive foreign legislation as a defense, but an agreement having anticompetitive effects as its only objective would also escape.

"Ibid., at p. 661.
"Ibid., at p. 669.
"Ibid., at p. 666.
7Ibid., at pp. 662, 663.
"Ibid., at pp. 665, 666.
"Ibid., at p. 661.
"Ibid., at p. 660.
"Ibid., at p. 670.
"Ibid., at p. 670-72.
"Ibid., at pp. 670, 671.
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State Action
George R. Whitten, Jr., Inc. v. Paddock Pool Builders, Inc."' is perhaps
most valuable for its discussions and clarifications of Parker v. Brown" and
the Noerr case, supra. The Parker Court had concluded that the Sherman Act
does not restrain a State, or its officers, unless Congress constitutionally determines otherwise.7" Whitten interpreted Parker as being at the opposite end of
the "spectrum" from the case at bar and it read that case as establishing
"... that valid government action confers antitrust immunity only when
government determines that competition is not the sumum bonum in a particular field, and deliberately attempts to provide an alternate form of public
regulation." 7
The middle of the "spectrum," so the Whitten Court determined, "...
is
occupied by cases in which the State has chosen to regulate a field, but State
policy is neutral or silent with respect to restraints of trade. Since there is no
conflict in such cases between State regulatory action and the policy of unfettered competition, the Courts have found no difficulty in denying antitrust
exemption.""
Whitten involved a situation in which the defendant sold its tied product to
government and quasi-government agencies through a professional hired by
the particular customer involved. The defendant allegedly used high-pressure
and/or fraudulent techniques to sell its products.79
In finding that the defendant's conduct did not come within the protection
of the Parker doctrine, supra, the Court declared, "When the government acts
under laws requiring competitive bidding, it signifies its intent to respond to
the signals of a competitive market on the same terms as any other consumer,
an intent which is consistent with the aims of the Sherman Act. This intent
would be frustrated, and the ultimate cost to the public substantially increased, if some sellers could nevertheless engage in anti-competitive practices
merely because they were dealing with the government.""
The thrust of the Court's concern, then, is pointed at the nature of the
government's involvement with the defendant. In Whitten, the defendant was
dealing with government in a reprehensible manner. The mere fact that'a
government purchased a product could not be found to amount to an assent to
anti-competitive practices on the defendant's part, and as such, the defendant
cannot successfully claim to be exempt from antitrust prohibitions.
424 F.2d 25 (1970).
"317 U.S. 341, 63 S. Ct. 307, 87 L. Ed. 315 (1943).
11424 F. 2d 25, at pp. 30-34.
"Ibid., at pp. 30, 31.

"Ibid., at p. 30.
"Ibid., at pp. 27, 29.
"Ibid., at p. 31.
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The Parkerdoctrine was clearly nof applicable as the government, in Whitten, was the party coerced by the business methods used by the defendant.
Were similar facts presented to the EEC Commission, it is quite probable that
it would, as did the Whitten Court, refuse a defense under such circumstances,
notwithstanding the Commission's reluctance to consider "measures merely
authorized" as a basis for a defense.
As to the Noerr doctrine, the Whitten Court reterred to the political activity
of the defendants as the key to the holding in that case.' The defendant's activities in Whitten were simply not covered by the protective policy supporting
the Noerr doctrine, a "...
pluralistic society founded upon the voices of
divergent interests ..
After expressing its doubts as to whether the Noerr Court intended its decision to cover a situation involving ". . . public officials engaged in purely
commercial dealings, when the case turned on the issues (. . .,") the Court applied the rationale that ". . . state legislatures, by enacting statutes requiring
public bidding, have decreed that government purchases will be made according to strictly economic criteria." 8 The Court then concluded that the immunity for efforts to influence public officials in the enforcement of laws does
,iot extend to efforts to sell products to public officials acting under com4
petitive bidding statutes.1
U.S. Case Law and the Commission Position
Several conclusions can be reached on the basis of the cases surveyed. In
determining whether a measure has been "imposed," the Commission could
consider precedents other than those in the cases and decisions of the EEC
organs. This would necessarily include accepting the fact that there are many
ways a foreign government can inflience a firm other than by direct orders or
mere authorizations, which might produce anti-competitive conduct on the
part of the firm.
The case law from the United States certainly illustrates that coercion can be
a two-way street. For example, a firm's influence on a government is not
tainted by the type of conduct found in Whitten, even though it may be impelled by anti-competitive motives and the courts of the United States will probably find that the defendant's activities are not prohibited by the antitrust
laws.8" If read literally, the Commission's position in regard to "measures imposed" would not include conduct within the protective scope of the Noerr

"Ibid., at p. 32.
"Id

.

"Ibid., at p. 33.
'Ibid., at p. 37.
"See Sacramento Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Chauffeurs, Teamsters and Helpers Local No. 150,
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and Pennington cases. Just how broad, or narrow, the Commission and the
Court of Justice interpret "measures imposed" as opposed to "measures
authorized" remains, of course, to be seen.
There is still a question as to whether the Noerr doctrine applies to United
States firms in regard to their relations with foreign States. In Whitten, supra,
the Court interpreted Continental Ore, supra, as not necessarily intimating
that-an exemption of the defendant's anti-competitive conduct would have
resulted from ratification by a government official if the inspection of the
alleged anti-competitive practices by that official would be less than thorough.
The issue in that case is whether the governmental action was taken by "real
decision makers." 8 The Whitten Court presumed that a different result would
have obtained ". . . .if defendants in Continental Ore, instead of seeking to
subvert the administration of the rationing program, had boldly sought a
change of policy from executive or legislative officials." 87 This seems to imply
that Noerr would apply in foreign context.
By its reference to "governments" in the Third Report on Competition
Policy (at page 27) to "authorities" in the Commission Decision of November
29, 197488 (pages 11-12), and by its failure to make any distinction between
such items, the Commission places EEC firms dealing with foreign States in
the precarious position of not knowing whether the distinction made in the
Whitten case would be recognized in the EEC.
Coercion or Permission
At least one writer has used the term "conduct required," when discussing
the exertion of influence by a foreign government upon United States firms
doing business in such foreign State, as distinguished from the political process
of petitioning a foreign government.89
The status of conduct which is "requested or induced" by foreign officials
remains unclear. The Oil Cartel consent decrees seem to recognize foreign
government inducement or economic necessity as justifications for engaging in

International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America,
440 F.2d 1096 (1971), which discusses the Noerr and Pennington cases, at pp. 1098, 1099; see also
California Motor Transport Company, et al. v. Trucking Unlimited, et al., 404 U.S. 508, 92 S. Ct.
609, 30 L. Ed. 2d 642, holding that although the right to petition extends to all departments of
government, such rights are not immunized from regulation when they are used as integral parts of
conduct which violates a valid statute.
"1424 F.2d 25, at p. 33. See note 8, at that page.
"Ibid., at p. 33, citing Castillo, Antitrust's Newest Quagmire, the Noerr-Pennington Defense,
66 MIcH. L. REV. 333, 342.
"Relating to the Franco-Japanese ballbearings agreement.
"87 YALE L. J. 268, at p. 282 (1974).
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otherwise prohibited acts."" ° Insofar as conduct which is "merely
authorized," the courts of the United States have refused to permit a defense
based on coercion.
The Occidental Petroleum Corporation CaseThe Act of State Doctrine Reviewed
Occidental Petroleum Corporation v. Buttes Oil and Gas Co." involved
alleged violations of the Sherman Act and the Clayton Act."2 The plaintiff
claimed that defendant's activities consisted of ". . . instigating a presently
pending international dispute over sovereign rights to a portion of the Gulf
allegedly covering the richest area of plaintiff's concession-with the result
that plaintiffs have been prevented from enjoying the fruits of their concession.'"
As two of five grounds upon which the defendants based their motion to
dismiss, the defendants contended that the federal court was precluded from
rendering a decision on the merits because of the Noerr doctrine, supra,
".. . [aInd the rule of judicial abstention known as the Act of State doctrine,
the two rules springing from different considerations."" The issue raised was
whether it applied to the enterprise-foreign State relationship. The defendants
cited Continental Ore, supra, as implying that the doctrine would apply if the
government involved had been solicited by the defendant. Although the Court
recognized that possibility, it pointed out that a contrary conclusion could be
inferred because the ContinentalOre Court did not bother to decide that particular issue.95 In interpreting this aspect of Continental Ore, the Occidental
Court drew a different inference than did the Whitten Court, supra.
The Occidental Court put forth the proposition that if the doctrine applied
at all to relations with a foreign government, it is limited by two considerations: first, the right of petition must be in jeopardy, and second, the foreign
government involved must not be a "far cry from the political process with
which Noerr was concerned." The Court then concluded that the cir9 6
cumstances of the case did not involve the purposes of the Noerr doctrine.
In considering the applicability of the Noerr doctrine, the Court did not indicate whether it would apply to relations with a "non-democratic" form of
government if non-application might force the defendant out of business in a

"Ibid., at p. 282.
"1331 F. Supp. 92 (C.D. Col. 1971), aff'dper curiam, 461 F.2d 1261 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 409
U.S. 950 (1972).
215 U.S.C.A. §§ 15 and 16.
"1331 F. Supp. 92, at p. 95.
"Ibid., at p. 107.
951d.

"Ibid., at p. 108.
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foreign State. Moreover, the Court did not consider the theory that if a "nondemocratic" State allows the right of petition, it is making allowances for
what is usually considered an aspect of the "democratic process." One might
ask whether the Court is advocating a policy which might have unconstitutional discriminatory characteristics in that the right of petition should not be
abridged whether or not United States firms are doing business in a
"democratic" or "non-democratic" society.
The Court granted the defendant's motion to dismiss based on the applicability of the "Act of State Doctrine." 97 There is authority to the effect
that the doctrine is applicable ". . . if the government officials were mere
pawns in a private conspiracy rather than a major force behind the
scheme . . .'" There is no indication in Occidental that the government officials involved could be classified as "mere pawns."
In examining the rationale of the landmark case in this area, Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 9 the Court reaffirmed that the act of state doctrine has a constitutional basis in the separation of powers doctrine. On such
basis, the Court found itself precluded from judging the case on its merits.'°0
Having rebutted the plaintiff's argument that the "Sabbatino Amendment"
applies as a limitation to the act of state doctrine in antitrust proceedings, applying only to expropriation by a foreign government, the Court indicated that
". .. the questioning of sovereign acts by the complaint results in its failure to
state a claim upon which relief may be granted."''
The Occidental Court did not consider the elimination of the firm's free will
as a result of the act of a foreign State, but considered the doctrine's place
strictly in terms of the political relations of the States involved. Thus, the act
of state doctrine could support the Commission's position, whether or not it
chose to analogize to the parent-subsidiary relationship, and a "measure imposed" so analyzed would prevent Article 85(1) from being applied.
Exemption v. Non-Existence
Two issues raised by the Commission's position, and not yet mentioned,
should not be bypassed. Is an agreement or a concerted practice resulting from
a "measure imposed" a violation of Article 85(1) that is exempted by Article
85(3), thus saving it from the effects prescribed by Article 85(2)? Generally
speaking, the case law of the United States discussed herein seems to indicate
that the defense of coercive foreign legislation and related defenses merely ex-

"Ibid., at p. 108.
"Ibid., at p. 108, citing 376 U.S. 398, at p. 423; 84 S. Ct. 923, p. 938.
9376 U.S. 398, 84 S. Ct. 923, I1 L. Ed. 2d 804 (1964).
10022 U.S.C.A. §2370(e), (2).
101331 F. Supp. 92, at pp. 111-13.
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empt a violation from antitrust prohibitions, and do not hold that a violation
was non-existent. The Commission's position, on the other hand, is that a
"measure imposed" precludes a violation from occurring because of the
"compulsory" nature of the defendant's conduct. By inference, it appears
that the Commission has confused its jurisdiction to hear and decide a matter
with its unwillingness, or ability, to enforce a decision when a foreign State is
involved.
Conclusion
The Commission's position as to what will constitute the defense of coercive
foreign legislation to the EEC rules of competition in proceedings before it remains unclear for lack of definition and clarification. Assuming predictability
and certainty of law to be desirable, and assuming further the availability of
legal principles and precedent as a guide, prompt clarification would appear to
be in order. It has been the purpose of this writing to suggest that the clarification process can be accomplished by drawing both from Community sources
and from United States case law as above described.
Bibliography
I. Cases of the Court of Justice
A. ICI v. EC Commission, (48/69) (1972) C.M.L.R. 1972; 2 CCH
COMM. MKT. REP. 11 8161 (July 14, 1972).
B. Beguelin Import Co. v. G.L. Import LA., (22/71) 17 Recueil 949;
(1972) C.M.L.R. 81; C.M.R. 8149, 9 C.M.L. Rev. 491.
II.Commission Decision
A. Re Christianiand Nielsen (decision of June 18, 1969), J. 0. 2969 L
165/12.
B. Franco-Japaneseballbearings agreement, decision relating thereto,
November 28, 1974.
III. Case law of the United States
A. American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 160 F. 184
(C.C.S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 166 F. 261 (2nd Cir. 1908), aff'd, 213 U.S.
347, 29 S.Ct. 511, 53 L. Ed. 826 (1909).
B. Continental Ore Company v. Union Carbide and Carbon Corporation, 370 U.S. 690.
C. Eastern Railroad President's Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight,
Inc., et al., 365 U.S. 127, 81 S. Ct. 523, 52 L. Ed. 2d 464, reh'g
denied, 365 U.S. 875, S.Ct. 899, 5 L. Ed. 2d 864.
D. George R. Whitten, Jr., Inc. v. PaddockPool Builders, Inc., 424 F.2d
25 (1970).

International Lawyer, Vol. 11, No. 4

638

INTERNA TIONAL LA WYER
E. Interamerican Refining Corporation v. Texaco Maracaibo, Inc., 307
F.Supp. 1302 (1970).
F.Parker v.Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 63 S.Ct. 307, 87 L. Ed. 315.
G. Occidental Petroleum Corporation v. Buttes Oil and Gas Co., 331
F.2d 1261 (C.D. Cal. 1971), aff'd per curiam, 461 F.2d 1261 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 950 (1972).
H. Sabre Shipping Corporation v. American President Lines, Ltd., 285
F. Supp. 949 (1968).
I. Sacramento Coca-Cola Bottling Corporation v. Chauffeurs,
Teamsters, and HelpersLocal No. 150, InternationalBrotherhood of
Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America,
440 F.2d 1096.
J. Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250, 18 S. Ct. 83, 42 L. Ed. 456
(1897).
K. United Mine Workers of America v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 85 S.
Ct. 1585.
L. United States v. Sisal Sales Corporation,274 U.S. 268.

IV. Documents
A. FirstReport on Competition Policy (Annexed to the "Fifth General
Report on the Activities of the Communities"), EEC Publication;
Brussels-Luxembourg; April 1972.
B. Second Report on Competition Policy (Annexed to the "Sixth
GeneralReport on the Activities of the Communities"), EEC Publication; Brussels-Luxembourg; April 1973.
C. Third Report on Competition Policy (Annexed to the "Seventh
GeneralReport on the Activities of the Communities"), EEC Publication; Brussels-Luxembourg; May, 1974.
D. Fourth Report on Competition Policy (Annexed to the "Eighth
General Report on the Activities of the Communities"), EEC Publication; Brussels-Luxembourg; May, 1975.
V. Journals
A. The Business Lawyer, Vol. 28, Special Issue; March, 1973.
B. Yale Law Journal, Vol. 84, no. 2, December, 1974.
VI. Books
A. Bellamy, Christopher, and Child, Graham D. Common Market Law
of Competition. London: Sweet and Maxwell, 1973.
B. Brewster, Kingman, Jr. Antitrust and American Business Abroad.
New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1958.

InternationalLawyer, Vol. 11, No. 4

Defense of Foreign Legislation in Competition Proceedings

639

C. Brownlie, Ian. Principlesof PublicInternationalLaw. 2d ed. Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1973.
D. Goldman, Berthold. European Commercial Law. London: Stevens
and Sons, 1973.
E. Parry, Anthony, and Hardy, Stephen. EEC Law. London:' Sweet and
Maxwell, 1973.
F. Stein, Eric, and Hay, Peter. Documents for Law and Institutions in
the Atlantic Area. U.S.A.: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., 1967.

InternationalLawyer, Vol. 11, No. 4

